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A. The Hypothetical Stasi Novels
Imagine that in 1975 Erich Honeckerl commissioned one of the
best writers in the German Democratic Republic to prepare a biog-
raphy of Rudolph Junkold, a fictional head of Stasi, the East German
secret police. I will refer to this book as "Version A." The completed
work emphasized Rudolph Junkold's background of heroic exploits
as an underground operative against the Nazis, followed by years of
devotion to duty in service of the Communist regime. While chief
of Stasi, the fictional Rudolph Junkold was ruthless in pursuit of
those who would undermine it. The biography was intended to serve
as a paradigm against which all children in the country would aspire
to conform their behavior. Bertram Potgeit, an actual Stasi head
** Professor of Law, St. Louis University. A. B., Washington University; M.A.,
J.D., University of Chicago. I am grateful to Steve Buck for English language and
Jeff Ordower for uncompensated German language research assistance, to Ilene
Ordower for her insightful comments on drafts of this article, and to Alan Howard
for his reading and comments. Thanks also to the Institute for Humane Studies
from which I received a grant while a law student in 1973 which enabled me to
take a first look at this topic.
I Erich Honecker was the dictatorial leader of the German Democratic Republic
from 1971 until 1989 when the peaceful revolution leading to East Germany's
unification with West Germany began. The German Democratic Republic (Deutsche
Demokratische Republik or DDR in German) generally has been referred to as East
Germany while the Federal Republic of Germany (Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland
or BRD), the surviving German state, generally has been referred to as West Germany.
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during Honecker's administration, knew of the biography, that he
had served as a model for the fictional head of Stasi, and, of course,
that the work by no means provided an accurate account of his life.
Yet he did not object to its publication at the time and, under then
current political circumstances, may well have felt that the idealized
portrayal of him would only help to advance his career.
Time passes; values change. East Germany merges into West Ger-
many. A major publishing house in the united Germany proposes to
reissue the biography. In the meantime, Bertram Potgeit has arranged
for the publication of a novel, call it "Version B," about a head of
Stasi who sought to undermine the Honecker regime. The novel's
hero helped many important, "subversive" individuals flee to the
west and in numerous ways materially contributed to the demise of
the Communist system in Germany.
Meanwhile, the writer who prepared Version A has a new book,
referred to in this article as "Version C." It depicts a rather ruthless
head of Stasi who learned many of his most effective techniques for
squelching dissent and forcing confessions to treasonous crimes from
the Nazis during his years in the Hitler youth and the SS.2 The novel
describes his rise to power in East Germany at the expense of men
of conscience, particularly members of certain minority groups within
the population, and closes with a chapter about his leadership of a
neo-Nazi party seeking a larger role in the politics of the newly
reunited Germany.
None of the three books uses Bertram Potgeit's name, yet some
readers are likely to associate the books' respective main characters
with Bertram Potgeit. Although intended as fictional accounts having
some basis in reality, for those readers who identify the main character
with Bertram Potgeit and assume all statements concerning the main
character to be applicable to and true of Bertram Potgeit, all the
books portray him in a false light. Bertram Potgeit would like to
suppress the publication of Versions A and C, while further dissem-
inating Version B. In both Germany and the United States, Bertram
Potgeit has a reasonable chance of success. In the German courts,
he may be able to restrain publication, while in the United States,
his potential damage award might deter prospective publishers from
publishing Versions A and C. Yet, neither jurisdiction prevents the
publication of the equally fictitious Version B which, under current
2 SS stands for Schutzstaffel (protection column) which was Hitler's elite guard
corps during his years in power.
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political conditions, reveals Bertram Potgeit in a false, but favorable,
light.
B. Comments about the United States Discussion
Over the twelve years since the decision in Bindrim v. Mitchell,'
legal publications have aired the issue of libel in fictional works
extensively. Since the beginning of 1985, for example, legal com-
mentary publications in the United States published at least thirteen
articles concerning United States libel law as it applies to fictional
works. 4 No fewer than fifteen articles published during the period
1978-1985 also addressed the topic.' In addition, there is one German
piece commenting on the American experience with libel in fiction. 6
The bulk of the articles dealing with libel in fiction express concern
about the standard which courts apply to impose liability on authors
and publishers. Most of the articles suggest modifications of the
burden of proof and limitations on the availability of damages in
1 92 Cal. App. 3d 61, 155 Cal. Rptr. 29 (1979), cert. denied 444 U.S. 984 (1979).
4 The number of articles may overstate the significance of the topic insofar as
the articles are concentrated in a few publications including one symposium on the
issue. In addition one article is a transcript of a roundtable discussion. The articles
include: Joel Gora, Introduction: Literature, Life and the Law, 51 BROOK. L. REV.
225 (1985); Frederick Schauer, Liars, Novelists, and the Law of Defamation, 51
BROOK. L. REv. 233 (1985); Marc A. Franklin, Fiction, Libel, and the First Amend-
ment, 51 BROOK. L. REV. 269 (1985); Paul A. LeBel, The Infliction of Harm through
the Publication of Fiction: Fashioning a Theory of Liability, 51 BROOK. L. REV.
281 (1985); Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Real People in Fiction: Cautionary Words
about Troublesome Old Torts Poured into New Jugs, 51 BROOK. L. REv. 355 (1985);
David A. Anderson, Avoiding Defamation Problems in Fiction, 51 BROOK. L. REv.
383 (1985); Martin Garbus & Richard Kurnit, Libel Claims Based on Fiction Should
Be Lightly Dismissed, 51 BROOK. L. REV. 401 (1985); Dan Rosen & Charles L.
Babcock, Of and Concerning Real People and Writers of Fiction, 7 Com. & ENT.
L.J. 221-263 (1985); Bruce P. Kriegman & Susan Reifel, Liability for Defamation
in Works of Fiction, 39 WASH. ST. B. NEws 19 (1985); Eva J. Goldenberg, Comment,
Plaintiffs in Pursuit of Privacy-Libel in Fiction, 5 CARDOzO ARTS & ENT. L.J.
545 (1986); Libel in Fiction: The Sylvia Plath Case and Its Aftermath, 11 COLUM.
VLA J. L. & ARTS 473 (1987) [hereinafter Libel in Fiction] (Edited transcript of a
roundtable discussion); Robert Asa Crook, Welcome to the Nineties, Brindrim v.
Mitchell: Now Drop Dead, 12 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 517 (1990); and Sandra
Davidson Scott, From Satirical to Satyrical: When Is a Joke Actionable?, 13 HASTINGS
COMM. & ENT. L.J. 141 (1991).
See Schauer, supra note 4, at 233 n.1.
6 Robert Rie, Der Schlisselroman und die amerikanischen Gerichte, 89 UFITA
(Archiv ffir Urheber, Film, Funk und Theaterrecht) 1 (1981). The title translates as:
The Keyhole Novel (roman 6 clej) and the American Courts (author's translation).
The article summarizes and comments on the case of Bindrim v. Mitchell, 92 Cal.
App. 3d 61, 155 Cal. Rptr. 29 (1979), cert. denied 444 U.S. 984 (1979).
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order to limit the remedy to the most worthy plaintiffs. A student
comment recommends an absolute privilege for fictional works under
the First Amendment, 7 but another commentator' opines that the
American courts provided too much protection to the defendant in
Pring v. Penthouse International.9 One other commentator suggests
that it is necessary to depart from traditional tort-based standards
and shift to a constitutional analysis-based "balancing of interests"
test.' 0 The test would balance the individual's interest in reputation
against freedom (presumably the author's) of speech so that only the
most weighty interests might overcome freedom of speech."
United States courts have employed traditional tort analysis to cases
of libel in fiction. Supreme Court pronouncements with respect to
the First Amendment protection for speech and the tort of libel have
little relevance to the libel in fiction issue. New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan 2 and its progeny limit tort remedies for public officials,
public figures, 3 and some newsworthy individuals 14 to cases in which
the false statement about the plaintiff is published with "actual
malice.' ' 5 The actual malice standard requires a showing that the
defendant published a false statement about the individual "with
knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it
was false or not."' 6 Such a standard proves to be of little importance
to libel in fiction cases.
Fiction, by definition, does not depict and is not intended to depict
actual events in the real world. Rather the fictional work creates its
own fictional reality which often, depending upon the author's writing
style and the author's desire or ability to create an apparent reality,
generates an illusion that the fictional events transpire in the objective
I Heidi Stam, Comment, Defamation in Fiction: The Case for Absolute First
Amendment Protection, 29 Am. U.L. REv. 571 (1980); See also E.D. Hirsch Ballin,
"Mephisto," 57 UFITA 21-31 (1971) (arguing for nearly full protection for literature).
Scott, supra note 4.
695 F.2d 438 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1132 (1983).
10 Zimmerman, supra note 4, at 355 (1985).
Id. at 365-66.
12 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967), extends the New York
Times v. Sullivan rule to public figures.
14 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), limited the reach of Ro-
senbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971), which was read to apply the
actual malice standard to individuals involved in newsworthy events.
11 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279-80.
16 Id.
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world. 7 If a plaintiff demonstrates that the work is about him or
her, the fictional world becomes real, and some readers may view
the fictional facts and events as assertions of fact concerning that
plaintiff. The author and publisher know that the statements made
about the fictional characters lack objective reality. Accordingly, if
those statements are taken as assertions about a specific real indi-
vidual, the author and publisher know them to be false. The actual
malice standard has been met. The plaintiff need prove only that the
work was "of and concerning" him or her and that the work injured
him or her in order to recover damages.
Successful plaintiffs have met this burden on scant evidence. The
plaintiff in Bindrim v. Mitchell bore little physical resemblance to
the character described in the novel but established that at least one
reader associated the "nude" therapy employed by the main character
with the plaintiff and his therapeutic methods. The author of the
defamatory novel attended one of the plaintiff's nude therapy sessions
and thus was familiar with the plaintiff's methods.
Courts have been less generous in protecting plaintiffs where the
fictional work attributes outrageous or impossible conduct to the
character with whom the plaintiff identifies. In Pring v. Penthouse
International,9 the fictional character engaged in physically impossible
and outrageous sexual conduct leading the court to conclude that no
reasonable reader would take the story's events to be assertions of
fact about the plaintiff.20 Similarly, in a parody case where no issue
of identification was present, Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell,2' a
jury determined that no reader would take the parody Campari
advertisement as assertion of fact about Jerry Falwell, so the parody
advertisement did not libel him; the jury, however, awarded Falwell
damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The Supreme
Court did not address the libel issue, but reversed on the damages
for intentional infliction of emotional distress and held unanimously
I? See infra note 74 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Stein's dissenting
opinion in the Mephisto case).
11 92 Cal. App. 3d at 72-73.
,9 645 F.2d at 443. The Penthouse story has its main character with whom the
plaintiff identifies, perform fellatio on her coach causing him to levitate. The events
described in the story take place before a national television audience.
2 See Scott, supra note 4, at 143-25 (arguing that Pring was entitled to recover).
2, 485 U.S. 46 (1988). The parody Campari advertisement has Falwell, a public
figure as leader of the so-called "moral majority," discussing his first time in an
outhouse with his mother. The double meaning clearly was intentional.
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that parody was a protected form of speech about public figures.
Falwell was a public figure as leader of the so-called "moral ma-
jority."
Concern about the limits of First Amendment protection for fiction
persists. The United States Supreme Court has not dealt with the
issue of libel in fiction directly. When it does, the Court may or may
not fashion a rule that will provide fiction special protection under
the First Amendment. Libel in fiction is not a uniquely American
problem. The issue has confronted the German courts at the highest
levels. If the German experience with the libel in fiction issue provides
any indication of how the United States Supreme Court will handle
it, the future is bleak for the proponents of special protection for
fiction. The German high courts have delegated principal responsi-
bility for balancing the interests involved to the trial courts, providing
them only a very general, but constitutionally derived, standard of
guidance.
C. The Purpose of this Article
Although the law upon which the German decisions is based differs
from United States law, the interests and protections involved are
not dissimilar and the German decisions accordingly instructive. In
both countries, a protected interest-free speech in the United States,
freedom of art in Germany-comes into conflict with the individual's
right to protection from the harm false statements about him or her
might do. The German constitution provides explicit protection for
the individual's sphere of personality," but the United States Con-
stitution does not. Yet such protection must be implicit in the United
States or else the protected free speech interest would always prevail
and parties injured by speech be left wholly without recourse.
The first part of the article summarizes and analyzes the principal
German case relating to the issue of libel and fiction. It highlights
the differences and similarities between United States and German
law. In its second part, the article turns to certain current trends in
literary theory, reader-response theory, in order to reveal a funda-
mental flaw in the German courts' analysis of the issue and to suggest
that absolute protection of fictional works from libel liability exposure
is warranted.
•2 See infra note 37 (discussion of Articles I and 2 of the German Basic Law).
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II. THE GERMAN EXPERIENCE
A. Introduction
In 1963 Nymphenburger Verlagshandlung, a West German pub-
lishing house, announced the pending publication of an edition of
Klaus Mann's works including his 1936 novel Mephisto-Roman einer
Karriere. While the novel had been published in Amsterdam23 and
in Paris24 during the Nazi period in Germany and again in East
Germany in 1956,25 it never had appeared in West Germany. Peter
Gorski, Gustaf Griundgens' adoptive son, sued to. enjoin the novel's
publication as defamatory of his adoptive father who served as a
model for the novel's main character. Since Grindgens was dead,
the trial court27 denied the injunction on the grounds, inter alia, that
the rights involved in protection of the individual's reputation die
with the individual, and the novel as a work of art enjoyed special
protection under the Basic Law. 2 Pending appeal, the appellate court
permitted the publication by Nymphenburger of an edition of 10,000
copies conditioned upon the insertion in the edition of an explanatory
foreword intended to limit the impact on Griindgens' personality
sphere. 29 Later the appellate court issued the injunction.30 The pub-
23 Querido Verlag published German exile literature until the German occupation
of the Netherlands in 1942.
24 The Pariser Tageblatt, a German language newspaper published in Paris, pub-
lished the novel in serialized form in 1936.
23 Aufbau-Verlag in East Berlin, East Germany published the novel with a notice
on its last page: "Alle Personen dieses Buches stellen Typen dar, nicht Portraits. K.
M." [All characters in this book represent types, not portraits. K. M. (the author's
initials).] (author's translation)
The publisher never disputed that Gustaf Griindgens was the model for the
main character of the novel, Hendrik Hofgen.
27 Judgment of Aug. 25, 1965, Landesgericht Hamburg [Hamburg State Court],
51 UFITA 352 (1969).
23 The Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany (Das Grundgesetz fir die
Bundesrepublik Deutschland) became effective May 23, 1949 upon the favorable
votes of the legislatures (Landtage)-of all the German states (Lander), except Bavaria,
occupied by the Allied Powers following the war.
29 The foreword read:
"An den Leser
Der Verfasser Klaus Mann ist 1933 freiwillig aus Gesinnung emigriet und
hat 1936 diesen Roman in Amsterdam geschrieben. Aus seiner damaligen
Sicht und seinem Ha. gegen die Hitlerdiktatur hat er ein zeitkritisches Bild
der Theatergeschichte in Romanform geschaffen. Wenn auch Anlehnungen
an Personen der damaligen Zeit nicht zu verkennen sind, so hat er den
Romanfiguren doch erst durch seine dichterische Phantasie Gestalt gegeben.
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lisher's appeals to the Federal Court of Justice3 and the Federal
Constitutional Court32 were of no avail. The injunction stood. 33
Mephisto tells the story of the world of the theater during the
early years of the Nazi regime in Germany. It centers around the
actor, Hendrik H6fgen, who collaborates with the Nazis in order to
Dies gilt insbesondere ffir die Hauptfigur. Handlungen und Gesinnungen,
die dieser Person im Roman zugeschrieben werden, entsprechen jedenfalls
weitgehend der Phantasie des Verfassers. Er hat daher seinem Werk die




The writer, Klaus Mann, out of conscience emigrated voluntarily in 1933
and wrote this novel in Amsterdam in 1936. Because of his view at that
time and his hatred for Hitler's dictatorship, he created an image of theater
history in the form of a novel which was critical of the period. Although
borrowings from individuals of that period are unmistakable, he first proc-
essed their form through his poetic imagination. This is especially true of
the main character. Actions and tendencies which are attributed to these
individuals correspond in large part to the writer's imagination. For that
reason he added the explanation to his work: 'All characters in this book
represent types, not portraits.'
The Publisher]
(author's translation)
30 Judgment of March 10, 1966, Hanseatisches Oberlandesgericht Hamburg [Ham-
burg Court of Appeals], 51 UFITA 362 (1969).
3, Judgment of March 20, 1968, BGH Gr. Sen. Z., 50 Entscheidungen des
Bundesgerichtshof in Zivilsachen [BGHZ] 133 (F.R.G.). The Federal Court of Justice
is established by Art. 95 (1) of the German Basic Law and is the higher court in
most civil and criminal matters. Its jurisdiction is primarily appellate.
32 Judgment of February 24, 1971, BVerfG, 30 Entscheidungen des Bundesver-
fassungsgericht [BVerfGE] 173 (F.R.G.); 51 UFITA 337. The Federal Constitutional
Court is established pursuant to Art. 92 of the German Basic Law. Its jurisdiction
is described in Art. 93 and generally involves issues of application or interpretation
of the Basic Law. However, it also is competent to resolve disputes between or
among states (Lander) of the federal republic, and parliament legislatively may assign
other cases to it. In the Mephisto case, the court was exercising its jurisdiction to
determine whether other courts correctly interpreted the Basic Law. The panel split
3-3 thereby affirming the decision of the Federal Court of Justice, a majority being
required to overturn another court's decision.
11 According to Berthold Spangenberg's introduction to the 1980 West German
edition of the novel published by Rowohlt Taschenbuch Verlag, by 1980 the novel
also had been translated into and published in eleven other languages. Klaus Mann,
Mephisto-Roman einer Karriere (Reinbek bei Hamburg, 1980), p. III. Since the
courts determined that GrUndgens' rights would diminish as memory of him faded
in Germany, Rowohlt elected to risk publishing the novel in 1980. The publisher
added an extensive introduction summarizing the legal history and attempting to
present additional evidence of Mann's lack of animosity toward Griindgens, as well
as evidence that the public's memory of Grindgens had faded considerably so that
the time for publication was ripe.
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advance his career. The actor cultivates a friendship with Hitler's
right hand man, Hermann G6ring, who helps him to become the
director of the state theater in Berlin and later a state councillor.
H6fgen generally basks in the glow of the Nazi hierarchy while
enjoying a masochistic sexual relationship with a black, female dancer
whom he eventually betrays to the Gestapo.14 In order to hedge his
bets, H6fgen also helps a Jewish actor escape the Nazis.
H6fgen bears considerable resemblance to the historical Gustaf
Gruindgens. Their careers are parallel, Griindgens being especially
closely associated with the role of Mephisto in Goethe's Faust. There
are significant dissimilarities as well. Following the war, it was learned
that Gruindgens did not collaborate with the Nazis, but used his
position to save the lives of Jewish actors-much to his own personal
risk. Neither was Griindgens a regular guest in G6ring's house, nor
did he deliver a speech at a party celebrating Goring's forty-third
birthday.
While Klaus Mann generally is not regarded as fine an author as
his father," some critics view him as having made an important
contribution to German literature, particularly the German exile lit-
erature of the 1930s and 40s. Such critics contended during the
litigation surrounding Mephisto that the availability of Mephisto was
14 Gestapo is an acronym for Geheime Statspolizei (Secret State Police). The Nazi
racial laws applied to Jews, not blacks. Sections 1 and 2 of the Gesetz zum Schutze
des deutschen Blutes und der deutschen Ehre vom 15. September 1935 (Law of
September 15, 1935 for Protection of German Blood and German Honor), Straf-
gesetzbuch mit den wichtigsten Nebengesetzen (Penal Law Book with the most
important Incidental Laws), C. H. Beck'sche Verlagshandlung (Minchen and Berlin
1944) 217, respectively prohibited marriage and extra-marital sexual relations between
members of the Aryan race and Jews. Nevertheless, the Nazis were no more fond
of blacks than they were of Jews. According to Robert Proctor, "[applicants for
membership in the Nazi party were asked to certify that they had neither Jewish
nor 'colored blood' . . . in their ancestry," ROBERT PROCTOR, RACIAL HYoENE,
MEDICINE UNDER THE NAZIs at 114 (1988). Disclosure of Hofgen's relationship with
a black could have resulted in grave consequences to him. It is interesting to note
that SS officers in the camps protected a number of Jewish women who serviced
the officers sexually in exchange for the protection. Thus, even within the elite
group, the racial purity laws were not respected. Moreover, Griundgens was reputed
to be gay so the black, female lover does not fit. Male homosexual activities were
also illegal. Sections 175 and 175a of Strafgesetzbuch, etc., supra this note, at 59-60.
3 Thomas Mann is probably the most respected German language author of the
twentieth century. His other son, Golo, became a comparatively well-known historian,
and his daughter, Erika, was an actress who at one time was married to Gustaf
Gruindgens. It is likely that H6fgen's poor marital relationship with Barbara Bruckner
is modelled after Gruindgens' marriage to Erika Mann.
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essential for the public to have a complete picture of Mann's literary
production and the literature of the World War II German ex-patriot
community.3 6
B. The German Decisions
In the view of the trial court, the general right of personality3 7
does not survive the individual. While other laws protect the survivors'
interests in preserving the memory and reputation of a decedent, in
the Mephisto case, such laws come into conflict with an express
constitutional protection of art and the right to disseminate it.3" But
the trial court does not stop with finding the protection of art to be
superior to the other laws which protect the survivors' interests in a
decedent. It takes the position that readers readily recognize the "free,
36 See, e.g., Judgment of August 27, 1965, Landesgericht Hamburg [Hamburg
State Court], 51 UFITA 352, 359-60 (1969).
17 The right of personality (das Pers6nlichkeitsrecht) encompasses both protection
against libel and protection of the intimate sphere. It derives from Articles I and
2 of the Basic Law.
Art. 1 (1) reads:
"The dignity of man shall be inviolable. To respect and protect it shall be
the duty of all state authority."
Art. 2 (1) reads:
"Everyone shall have the right to the free development of his personality
in so far as he does not violate the rights of others or offend against the
constitutional order or the moral code."
The Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany, as amended. Translation
published by the Press and Information Office of the Federal Government,
Bonn (1981).
The original follows. Grundgesetz Art. I, Abs. 1: "Die Wuirde des Menschen
ist unantastbar. Sie zu achten und zu schfitzen ist Verpflichtung aller staat-
lichen Gewalt."
Art. 2, Abs. 1: "Jeder hat das Recht auf die freie Entfaltung seiner
Pers6nlichkeit, soweit er nicht die Rechte anderer verletzt und nicht gegen
die verfassungsmaige Ordnung oder das Sittengesetz verst6Bt."
GRUNDGESETZ [Constitution] [GG] art. 1(1)-2(1) (F.R,G.) [hereinafter Constitution].
38 Basic Law Art. 5 (3) reads:
"Art and science, research and teaching, shall be free ......
Grundgesetz Art. 5, Abs. 3:
"Kunst und Wissenschaft, Forschung und Lehre sind frei .... Consti-
tution, supra note 37, art. 5(3).
Art. 5 (1) guaranties freedom of the speech and the press and outlaws
censorship, but Art. 5 (2) limits those protections by provisions of the
general laws, inter alia. The Federal Court of Justice and the Federal
Constitutional Court view paragraph (2) as placing a limitation on paragraph
(1) but not paragraph (3).
See supra text accompanying note 58.
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poetic formulation" given the characters and events for which
Gruindgens and others serve as models.3 9 Despite the apparent su-
periority of the right of art, the court nevertheless balances the right
of personality against art in concluding that Mephisto wins. It regards
the danger to Griindgens' good name to be insubstantial in view of
other information about him which is available to the public. More-
over, the novel, whether or not a "keyhole" novel, 40 deserves all the
protections of art. A novel is the expression of its author's opinion,
and in this case that opinion of the Nazis is provided with "masterful
sarcasm. ' 41 Since the novel is known throughout the world and forms
part of the material about that period in German history, it should
not be outlawed in Germany.42
The Hamburg Court of Appeals finds that the basic right of
personality survives and is enforceable by the decedent's heirs. Critical
acclaim notwithstanding, the court takes a far less generous approach
to the novel and the reading public. It has its own opinion and
accordingly labels the novel as undeserving of protection as a work
of art. Rather it is simply "libel in the form of a novel." ' 43 It sees
the public as having such strong desire for sensation that it readily
transfers whatever Mann wrote of H6fgen to Griindgens. The alien-
ation which would enable Mann's readers to separate H6fgen from
Grindgens is absent. The court is particularly outraged by Hofgen's
masochistic, sexual relationship with the black woman, but apparently
did not think the attribution of that relationship to Griindgens to be
so outrageous that the reader would be able to reject it as false. 4
19 Judgment of August 25, 1965, Landesgericht Hamburg [Hamburg State Court],
51 UFITA at 357: "Im vorliegenden Fall hat die Schilderung der Personen und des
Handlungsablaufs, fur jeden Leser ersichtlich, eine freie dichterische Gestaltung
erfahren." [In the instant case, obvious to every reader, the description of characters
and plot has experienced a free, poetic formulation.] (emphasis added) (author's
translation).
40 Roman d clef (Schliisselroman in German) is the customary literary term
referring to a novel which intentionally depicts and frequently defames individuals
only thinly disguising them so as to leave them easily recognizable by the general
reader.
4 Judgment of August 25, 1965, Landesgericht Hamburg [Hamburg State Court],
51 UFITA at 358-59.
42 Id. at 361.
4 Judgment of March 10, 1966, Hanseatisches Oberlandesgericht Hamburg [Ham-
burg Court of Appeals], 51 UFITA at 369. Translation of the German "eine
Schmahschrift in Romanform" is mine.
- Compare Pring v. Penthouse International, 695 F.2d 438 (10th Cir. 1982), cert.
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Once having determined that the novel was about Griindgens and
that readers would be unable to separate fact from fiction, prohibiting
publication of the novel was a short step. Since Grindgens provided
no occasion for the novel's criticism of him, there can be no justi-
fication for the novel. 45 The appellate court does not even consider
the novel to be worthy of a position as a document of the emigration
period. Rather it relegates Mephisto to the position of one man's
opinion of the theater world in Germany during that era.46
The appellate court concludes, however, that the injunction need
not be unlimited in duration. Publication will be permissible when
memory of the actor Griindgens fades and an extensive introduction
providing an accurate picture of him and his activities during the
period accompanies the publication. 47 The limitation on the duration
of the injunction raises rather serious issues. Unlike pornography,
for example, which the court might view as utterly lacking in value
and, therefore, subject to permanent injunction, this book is worthy
of publication in the future. Presumably it has merit. In the case of
pornography one might argue that the chilling effect on the author
is of no importance, as the product is devoid of value." But what
of this novel which the court acknowledges as having at least some
value and being entitled to protection as art?
Before proceeding to decisions of the Federal Court of Appeals
and the Federal Constitutional Court, some observations about the
decisions of the trial court and initial appellate court seem appropriate.
Both courts review the quality and literary significance of Mephisto,
and both make observations concerning the act of reading. The trial
court identifies and emphasizes the novel's literary merit and its
importance to German exile literature. 49 The appellate court denigrates
it, relegating it to a rather minor position within the world of German
literature.5 0 Similarly, the trial court ascribes to the reader the ability
denied 462 U.S. 1132 (1983) with Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46
(1988) (the offensive publication was so outrageous that no reader would believe it
to be true of the individual so that there was no libel).
41 Judgment of March 10, 1966, Hanseatisches Oberlandesgericht Hamburg [Ham-
burg Court of Appeals], 51 UFITA at 370.
46 Id. at 374.
41 Id. at 374-75. Rowohlt Taschenbuch Verlag relied upon this limitation on the
injunction when in 1980 it published the novel with an extensive introduction. See
supra note 33.
48 Such a conclusion concerning pornography probably is also unwarranted. See
infra discussion text accompanying note 112 (discussion of pulp fiction).
49 See supra text accompanying note 41.
10 See supra text accompanying note 43.
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to recognize and evaluate the effect of the artistic imagination upon
the raw material of the novel, so that the reader does not accept the
events and characterizations as factual.5 ' The appellate court takes a
far less generous approach to the reader and views the average reader
as someone who is eager to believe whatever the author writes without
attempting to discriminate between truth and fiction or to discount
the credibility of a fictional or fictionalized account. 2
It is difficult to say whether or not these literary judgments were
determinative to the outcome of the litigation. Perhaps each court
decided the case first and then offered arguments to support its
decision. But whether or not determinative, it seems significant that
the courts perceive it to be necessary to evaluate both the literary
merit and the general impact of the novel upon its reader. Somehow
those evaluations are material to the resolution of the issue. Disre-
garding technical legal issues, the courts have fundamental, literary
disagreements. While the trial court may imply that the quality of
the art is irrelevant to consideration of its protectability," the appellate
court does not wish to protect unworthy art.54 In addition to these
literary considerations of quality and reader impact, the appellate
court also examines the motivations of the author and finds them
to be evil. Evil motives enhance the arguments that the novel is
unworthy of protection.5"
The Federal Court of Justice5 6 and the Federal Constitutional Court 7
focus their attention primarily on the legal standards and the iden-
tification of the appropriate constitutional provisions and their lim-
itations. The Federal Court of Justice definitively characterizes
protection of art58 as a special law not subject to the general limitations
on freedom of speech and the press. The Constitutional Court con-
", See supra text accompanying note 39.
52 See supra text accompanying note 43.
11 Judgment of Aug. 25, 1965, Landesgericht Hamburg [Hamburg State Court],
57 UFITA at 360 (asserting that whether or not the novel is a roman 4 clef is
irrelevant to its right to protection as a work of art).
14 Id. at 372 (granting that even "libel in the form of a novel" may be art but
asserts that it is not entitled to protection).
11 Rosen & Babcock, supra note 4 (suggesting enhancing protection for fiction
by creating a malice standard which must be satisfied before imposing liability on
the author). In the view of the appellate court in Mephisto, Klaus Mann apparently
would meet such a standard and be subject to liability.
56 See supra note 31.
11 See supra note 32.
58 Constitution, supra note 37, art. 5(3). See supra note 38.
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firms this characterization of the protection of art provision as lex
specialis but rejects the "free development of personality" provision59
as a source of the rights which protect Griindgens from defamation
after his death. The "human dignity" provision 6° is the only source
of post mortum protection for Gruindgens, but it is the guiding
principle of the entire Basic Law and consequently of primary im-
portance.
Since the general laws cannot place limitations on the freedom of
art, only when art comes into conflict with other protections found
in the Basic Law is it subject to restriction. Where it does conflict
with other Basic Law rights or protections, a balancing of interests
is required to ascertain which right or protection prevails. 6' Both
federal courts consider whether the court of appeals adequately bal-
anced protection of art with post mortum protection of Gruindgens'
right of personality under Article 2 in the case of the Court of Justice
and Article 1 in the case of the Constitutional Court.
Despite a finding that the court of appeals erroneously failed to
limit its consideration of applicable law to the constitutional provi-
sions, the Federal Court of Justice holds that the appellate court's
factual conclusions are without legal error.62 The court approves the
appellate court's characterization of the novel as "libel in the form
of a novel." ' 63 Approval of the appellate court's characterization of
the novel determines the outcome of the appeal. The Federal Court
of Justice emphasizes that art is entitled to its creative space and
that an artwork may fictionalize events and speech, but only so long
as the overall image the work projects concerning a real individual
is correct. 64
Similarly, the prevailing opinion 65 in the Federal Constitutional
Court takes a narrow view of its scope of review. Reliance by the
'9 Id. art. 2(1). See supra note 37.
60 Id. art. 1(1). See supra note 37.
61 Phillip M6hring, Verfassungsgerichtliche Wertentscheidungen: Anmerkungen
zur "Mephisto"-Entscheidung des Bundesverfassungsgerichts in Dimensionen des
Rechts: Gedichtnisschrift fur Ren6 Marcic 575, 578 (Duncker u. Humboldt, Berlin
1974) (suggests that the freedom of art is one of numerous specific, clarifying
extensions of the human dignity provision of the Basic Law rather than a conflicting
provision).
6 Supra note 31, 51 UFITA at 344.
63 The finding is mentioned supra at note 43.
64 Supra note 31, 51 UFITA at 348. The United States Supreme Court recently
took a similar approach to fictionalized quotations in news reporting. So long as
the alleged quote conveys accurately the sense of what the public figure speaker
said, failure to reproduce the speaker's words faithfully is not actionable. Masson
v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 111 S.Ct. 2419 (1991).
63 The Federal Constitutional Court affirmed in a split decision. Judgment of
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lower courts66 on Art. 2 of the Basic Law as well as Art. 1 is not
reversible error as the other courts indeed balanced the pertinent
interests. The Constitutional Court does not review de novo. 67 In
large part, discussion of art theory makes up the body of the prevailing
opinion and the vigorous dissent by Justice Stein. The opinion recites
the views of the Minister of Justice who points out that art must be
judged as art. Not every reader need be able to recognize the artistic
sublimation of the material from the real world. 6 According to the
court, the guaranty of freedom of art includes both the freedom to
create and the freedom to disseminate the creation so that it can
have its impact in the world. 69 Although the prevailing justices rec-
ognize that the novel transforms reality,70 the transformation in this
case is insufficient to persuade them to reverse.
Justice Stein in his dissent, in addition to asserting that the court
should review constitutional issues without deferring to the findings
of the other courts, 7' takes a more generous view of the artistic
process. He contends that the prevailing justices as well as the lower
courts simply compare events depicted in the book with reality,
thereby failing to give adequate recognition to the artistic world of
the book. 72 An artist selects material of importance from the real
world and reforms it to comply with his or her artistic reality. 73
Interestingly, however, in support of his argument that literary char-
acters take on their own realities, Justice Stein levels a rather serious
criticism at Mann's artistry and thereby undercuts his later argument
concerning the quality and importance of the novelist. Justice Stein
points out that H6fgen lacks nuance in characterization in the novel. 74
February 24, 1971, BVerfG, 30 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts
[BVerfGE] 173 (F.R.G.).
66 The Federal Court of Justice is not truly a lower court. Constitution, supra
note 37, art. 95(1). Its decisions are only subservient to those of the Constitutional
Court when and insofar as a constitutional issue is involved. Id. art. 93(1). The
Constitutional Court has no jurisdiction to review decisions of the Court of Justice
concerning other matters. Id. art 95(1).
67 Judgment of Feb. 24, 1971, 30 BVerfGE at 196-97.
68 Id. at 185. Cf. Bindrim v. Mitchell, 92 Cal. App. 3d 67 (1979) (holding it is
necessary only for a single reader to identify the character with the living person
for the novel to be held to be "of and concerning" the plaintiff).
"I Judgment of Feb. 24, 1971, 30 BVerfGE at 189 (discussing the two freedoms
of Werkbereich, realm of creation, and Wirkbereich, realm of effect or reception).
10 Id. at 190.
1 Id. at 202.
72 Id. at 203-4.
11 Id. at 206-7.
14 Justice Stein wrote: "[dla. H6fgen ein Typus und kein Portrat ist, ergibt sich
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To Justice Stein, lack of nuance signals that the character is not
intended to be real and identification with the real individual un-
thinkable. But one generally classifies lack of nuance in characteri-
zation as aesthetically displeasing and associates it with second rate
novelists who are unable to give their characters more than a wooden
existence.7
A second dissenting opinion criticizes the lower courts for examining
details but missing the overall picture of the novel. 76 H6fgens' sexual
perversion and betrayal of his mistress, for example, symbolizes his
political weakness." Justice Rupp von Briinneck admits she does not
think much of the novel but considers artistic quality to be irrelevant
to the scope of its protection. And she cites New York Times Co.
v. Sullivan7" for the position that in the absence of "actual malice"
there is the need for vigorous, unencumbered political debate con-
cerning public figures such as Griindgens. Of course, under the New
York Times's standard, in a damage action, the publisher may well
have lost in the United States.79
C. The Stasi Novels Under German Law
I have assumed that none of the three versions of the novel s°
accurately depicts the life and career of Bertram Potgeit, but readers
schon aus dem Typisierenden in der Zeichnung der Romanfigur, in der Zwischent6ne
fast ganz fehlen . . . . " [that H6fgen is a type and not a portrait becomes obvious
from the typifying element in the depiction of the character in which nuances
(intermediate tones) are almost completely lacking.] Id. at 211. (author's translation)
(emphasis added).
75 The same criticism, but always as a criticism, occasionally has been levelled
at such quite well-regarded authors as Charles Dickens. See, e.g., Morton Zabel,
Introduction to CHARLES DIcKENs, BLEAK HOUSE xxviii (Houghton Mifflin ed. 1956)
(1853).
76 Judgment of Feb. 24, 1971, 30 BVerfGE at 122.
77 Id. at 223.
11 N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
'9 See supra text accompanying note 12. Under United States law injunctive relief
likely would be an unacceptable remedy, as the Supreme Court has expressed a
particular distaste for prior restraints. See New York Times v. United States, 403
U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (involving the government's unsuccessful efforts to enjoin
publication in the New York Times and Washington Post of material from a classified
report commonly referred to as the Pentagon Papers but officially entitled: "History
of the U.S. Decision-Making Process on Viet Nam Policy.")
The Constitutional Court has interpreted Art, 5 (1), sentence 3 of the Basic Law
which outlaws censorship to refer to censorship before publication only (Vorzensur
or Praventivzensur in German), not subsequent injunctive relief. Judgment of Apr.
25, 1972, BVerfG, 33 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts 52, 71-72 (F.R.G.).
The concept of "prior restraint" under United States law would seem to imply pre-
first publication prohibition but in practice prevents restraint on subsequent pub-
lications or dissemination, as such restraint would be prior to re-publication.
See supra text accompanying note I for descriptions of the hypothetical novels.
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of all three would identify Bertram Potgeit as the model for the main
character. Version A portrays him as an avid and ruthless Communist,
version C as an ex-Nazi and current neo-Nazi supporter and version
B as a democrat helping to bring about changes from the repressive
Communist regime in East Germany. Unless version B offends the
personality rights of other individuals, Bertram Potgeit alone would
have a cause of action to prevent the book's publication. Absent a
complainant, Bertram Potgeit is free to disseminate version B without
limitation.
Even if version B provided accurate information concerning Ber-
tram Potgeit and his career, under the Mephisto cases, its publication
would be immaterial to the decisions with respect to the other novels.
By 1965 Grindgens already had been exonerated with respect to his
activities during the Third Reich."' Nevertheless the courts must not
have viewed the availability to the public of accurate information
about Griindgens as ameliorating the adverse impact upon his sphere
of personality from the libellous content of the novel.8 2 In outlining
the contents of the introduction to the novel which should accompany
its publication at some unspecified future date, availability of accurate
data, except as part of the novel itself, does not prevent the injury
to the individual's personality.
That version B provides a distorted, but favorable, image of Ber-
tram Potgeit raises questions about its impact upon the publication
of versions A and C. Perhaps Potgeit, by involving himself in the
publication of version B, has opened a debate permitting versions A
and C additional leeway in their depictions of him. Two cases in-
volving Franz Josef Strauss, the Christian Democrat Union's can-
didate for chancellor in 1980, shed some light on this topic. Strauss
certainly had placed himself in the public eye voluntarily. One also
may assume that in the course of a political campaign not all state-
ments made about Strauss by him and his supporters were completely
accurate. At the very least there must have been exaggeration of his
good qualities.
The first case, known as the street theater case, 83 involves a street
theater performance based on Bertold Brecht's poem "Der Anach-
ronistische Zug oder Freiheit und Democracy."8' A person resembling
81 Hamburg Court of Appeals decision, supra note 30, at 371.
82 Judgment of Feb. 24, 1971, 30 BVerfGE at 215-16 dissenting opinion) (refer-
encing the literature concerning Griindgens).
83 Judgment of July 17, 1984, BVerfG, 67 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfas-
sungsgerichts [BVerfGEI 213 (F.R.G.).
84 The title translates as "The Anachronistic Procession or Freedom and De-
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Franz Josef Strauss is depicted seated in a vehicle beside the driver.
Puppets masked as well-known Nazi leaders are in the back seat.
The Nazi leaders represent repression, leprosy, fraud, stupidity, mur-
der and robbery. The trial court fined the person portraying Strauss
and the organizer of the procession for defaming Strauss. The Con-
stitutional Court remanded the case for further consideration of the
balancing of constitutional interests. It held that the lower courts did
not consider the importance of the constitutional protection of art
adequately. Since the street theater was art, it was not subject to the
limitations of the ordinary laws under which the individuals involved
were fined. Accordingly, they could be punished only if, in balancing
Strauss's constitutional right of personality against artistic freedom
under the specific facts of the case, Strauss would prevail. The lower
courts based their judgment on a single scene out of context of the
performance as a whole. The Federal Constitutional Court emphasizes
the need to consider the multiple possible interpretations of the scene
in the performance..
This first Strauss case implies that the court will allow considerable
latitude in the use of art insofar as it holds that involvement of the
artist or use of the artistic product in the political process does not
lessen the scope of its protection under the Basic Law. Moreover,
the decision supports a broad definition of art to include the avant
garde, although some people might not view it as art at all. It is
entitled to the same constitutional protection as more traditional
manifestations of art.
The second Strauss decision, usually referred to as the political
satire case,85 undercuts the force of the first. As in the Mephisto
case, the court limits its review function to a determination of whether
the lower courts adequately balanced the interests of the parties. In
this political satire case, the magazine konkret (concrete) published
several caricatures of Strauss as a pig. In one caricature he is cop-
ulating with another pig in judicial robes. In other caricatures he is
engaged in various sexual activities alone or with other pigs. The
mocracy" and is based on Percy Bysshe Shelley's poem "The Masque of Anarchy:
Written on the Occasion of the Massacre in Manchester." Id. at 214. Brecht is the
celebrated German poet and playwright known for his socialistic themes emphasizing
the plight of the working class and other downtrodden groups in the society. See
MARTIN ESSLIN, BRECHT: THE MAN AND His WORK 227 (1961). There is a theater
in the formerly eastern sector of Berlin dedicated to performance of his works.
11 Judgment of June 3, 1987, BVerfG, 75 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfas-
sungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 369 (F.R.G.).
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court acknowledges that the caricatures are entitled to protection as
art but finds no reversible error. In the court's view, the lower courts
properly balanced the magazine's rights of protection as art against
Strauss's personality rights before penalizing the magazine. Presum-
ably, the Constitutional Court would affirm in the street theater case
as well if the lower courts conclude on remand, after balancing the
rights of art against Strauss's personality rights, that Strauss was
excessively defamed.
That Potgeit placed himself in the public eye with version B would
not seem to lessen his protection where the publication severely and
unfavorably distorts his image. In the political satire case, the court
recognizes that politicians-and probably other ptblic figures as well-
are subject to criticism, the protection of that criticism stops where
it clashes with protection of the politicians' rights of human dignity
protected by the Basic Law. If characterizing Potgeit as a Nazi-type
as in version C or a staunch and relentless Communist as in version
A offends Bertram Potgeit's human dignity, the special protection
of the novels as works of art will not prevail over Potgeit's rights
of personality.
Counterintuitively perhaps Potgeit's failure to object to publication
of version A when it first appeared in East Germany may be im-
material to the balancing of interests. Since Bertram Potgeit was in
fact the chief of Stasi, he hardly could object to an inaccurate
publication which showed him, from the perspective of the regime
then in power, in a favorable light. Objection to the book would
have rendered him suspect in that he would have had to admit he
was not so ruthless, an admission which might have cost him his job
and more. Similarly, had Gruindgens objected to the first exile pub-
lication, his objections may have compromised his ability to function
and help others during the Third Reich, and even may have endan-
gered him.16 In addition, the courts in the Mephisto cases did not
consider it to be significant that some copies of the earlier editions
of the book already were available in West Germany, because in
their view additional harm would be done to Griindgens by further
publication.
D. Reader-Response Theory and Libellous Fiction
One of the finest East German writers prepared versions A and C
of the Stasi novels. If the courts enjoin publication of Version C
816 The courts do consider it significant that after the war Griundgens continually
sought to suppress the novel.
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and re-publication of Version A, a portion of that author's work
becomes unavailable to the reading public. Removal of the novels
from the body of accessible literature makes a value judgment on a
broad scale. The legal dispute implicates not just the rights of the
author to disseminate his or her work versus the rights of the defamed
individual, but the rights of the public to receive and have access to
the literary product. The overall public value of the product is not
easy to evaluate.
Courts and legal commentators appear to comprehend the general
n~ture of the creative process. Both discuss how writers transform
the raw material of their experiences into the literary product.87 Their
characters rarely are wholly fictional. Usually, people the author
knows provide the raw material for the characters, and those char-
acters frequently are amalgamations of more than one person.8" Com-
mentators offer lists of critically well-regarded novels which might
have been considered libellous when first published.89 But while courts
and commentators understand how the writer works and that libel
laws might jeopardize the creative process, in my view they do not
appreciate the full breadth of the danger presented by the libel claim.
The Hamburg State Court and the Hamburg Court of Appeals
reach diametrically opposed conclusions concerning the constituency
of the reading public and the manner in which it receives a work of
fiction. The Hamburg State Court determined that readers would
recognize the fictionalized nature of the narrative and understand
that actual events had been filtered through the author's imagination
and modified and distorted to suit the needs of the artistic product.
The appellate court considered the reading public ready to believe
whatever publishers might offer it to satisfy its thirst for scandal.
17 See supra text accompanying note 74 (discussing Justice Stein's dissenting
opinion in the Mephisto case). See also Comment, "Clear and Convincing" Libel:
Fiction and the Law of Defamation, 92 YALE L.J. 520, 535-37 (1983) (identifying
fiction as synecdoche; characters and events are representative of a greater whole).
" See WRITERS AT WoRK: TH PARIs REvIEw INTERVIEWS (M. Crowley ed. 1958).
Rosen & Babcock, supra note 4, at 225-33 (discussing this issue in some detail);
Libel in Fiction, supra note 4, at 484 (Judith Rossner comments on the selection
and development of characters).
" Klaus Kastner, Freiheit der Literatur und Personlichkeitsrecht, 35 NJW (Neue
Juristische Wochenschrift) 601, 602 (1982) (offering examples from German litera-
ture); Schauer, supra note 4, at 261 (offering examples from American literature in
which characters may have been identified with real individuals). Rosen & Babcock,
supra note 4, 221-22 (discussing how residents of Asheville, North Carolina saw
themselves and their town in Thomas Wolfe's Look Homeward Angel).
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Both courts probably are equally correct in their identification of
types of readers but neither correctly identifies all readers.
E. The Rights and Interests of the Reader
Literary theory9° teaches us that literature and the reading of it is
an interactive process. While the author contributes the text to the
interpretive process, his or her control over the work ends once it is
committed to paper. The reader brings along to the reading a network
of interpretive norms which enable him or her to understand and
utilize the literary product. The norms differ from reader to reader,
rendering interpretation of a literary work multi-dimensional. Since
the work is subject to many interpretations by the reader, the author's
purpose in writing, if even identifiable, leads to one of the inter-
pretations but by no means the only valid one. Each network of
norms may generate a discrete, but equally valid, understanding of
the literary product, while the product changes its significance with
each of the interpretations. The quality, or at least the durability,
of a literary work may depend upon its flexibility, its accessibility
to a multiplicity of readers applying differing interpretive norms
finding the work useful in satisfying some reading related need of
the reader. "The devil can cite Scripture for his purpose." 9'
Mephisto can be read on many levels as readers approach it with
differing interpretive norms. Certainly one group of readers fits the
90 WOLFGANG ISER, THE ACT OF READING, A THEORY OF AESTHETIC RESPONSE
(Johns Hopkins University Press 1978), and STANLEY FISH, Is THERE A TEXT IN THIS
CLASS? THE AuTHoRrrY OF INTERPRETIVE COMMUNITIES (Harvard University Press
1980), are probably the best known of the works on reader-response theory in the
United States. RAMAN SELDEN, A READER'S GUIDE TO CONTEMPORARY LITERARY
THEORY (The University of Kentucky Press 1989), ELIZABETH FREUND, THE RETURN
OF THE READER: READER-RESPONSE CRITICISM (Methuen 1987) and READER-RESPONSE
CRITICISM: FROM FORMALISM TO POST-STRUCTURALISM (Jane P. Tompkins ed., The
Johns Hopkins University Press 1980), provide excellent overviews of the topic,
although, the last named has become slightly out of date. Many other primary texts
are significant to the development of the theory and its permutations; see AREEL
DOR MAN, HACIA LA LIBERACION DEL LECTOR LATINOAMERICANO (Ediciones del Norte
1984); Hans Robert Jauss, Toward an Aesthetic of Reception (Timothy Bahti trans.),
2 THEORY AND HISTORY OF LITERATURE (1982), and STEVEN MArLLOUX, INTERPRETIVE
CONVENTIONS, THE READER IN THE STUDY OF AmERiCAN FICTION (Cornell University
Press 1982) to name just a few. Majorie L. DeVault, Novel Readings: The Social
Organization of Interpretation, 95 AM. J. OF SOCIOLOGY 887-921 (1990) (providing
a sociologically-oriented case study of differing interpretations on a single novel
which are dependent upon interpretive communities and social perspectives which
change over time).
9' WLLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE MERCHANT OF VENICE, Act I, Scene iii.
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description of the appellate court as ready to accept as true the
scandalous "allegations" of the novel. Yet even within that group,
interpretive frameworks may differ, as will the reasons for believing
and the use to which the reader will put the false information. For
example, some readers may use the book to satisfy their voyeuristic
taste for "dirt" about specific individuals in public life. Others may
know or care nothing about Griindgens but may be far more interested
in the perversions of actors, or the absence of moral standards among
public figures who emerged unscathed from their lives in Nazi Ger-
many. Arguably the satisfaction of such base desires hardly recom-
mends the book for protection.
Yet, at the same time and with equal interpretive validity are other
possible norms which various readers might apply to the work. Ob-
viously those closest to Griindgens and whose opinion probably would
be most important to Griindgens would know that the actions at-
tributed to him do not comport with reality. They might be likely
to interpret the novel as reflecting Klaus Mann's bitterness and venge-
fulness. Moreover, a sociologically or psychologically oriented reader
might extract from Mephisto insights into the functioning and views
of the German exile community of World War II. A biographical
critic might contend that the novel is significant for what it contributes
to the understanding of its author, and perhaps his family as well.
A Marxist reader may approach the work as exemplifying the cap-
italistic decadence which paved the way for Hitler. A religiously-
based observer may read the book as the Faust legend, a parable of
selling one's soul to the devil. Others may aver that the novel has
no extrinsic meaning and seek to deconstruct it to ferret out its
intrinsic significance. And some readers simply may be interested in
the story as an aesthetic experience.
Moreover, even in the view of the courts which enjoin publication
of Mephisto, interpretation and importance of the work is rarely
static; it varies with time and changing interpretive norms. 92 The
courts identify two discrete periods which are significant to the in-
terpretive history of the novel and during which the outcome of the
litigation would differ. Those two are the period following Griindgens'
exoneration and the period commencing when familiarity with
Griindgens has faded from the public memory. During the first,
92 Cf. Stanley Fish, Change, in DOING WHAT CoMEs NATURALLY: CHANGE, RHET-
ORIC, AND THE PRACTICE OF THEORY IN LITERARY AND LEGAL STUDIES, ch. 7 (Duke
Univ. 1989).
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publication is impermissible because of the intrusion on Gruindgens'
rights of personality, protection of his dignity. During the second,
the book may be published, but only if the publication includes a
preface explaining the author's relationship to Grindgens and the
truth about Grindgens' activities during the years of the Nazi regime.
These two periods imply the existence of a third more remote
period when protection of Grundgens' rights of personality becomes
unnecessary because readers are unfamiliar with or have lost all
interest in Gustaf Grundgens. At that time, presumably, the explan-
atory preface may be excluded from the publication.
A fourth period, that of creation, also would appear to be of
interest. During that period, the falsity of the activities attributed to
H6fgen/Grindgens would have been unavailable to a court located
outside Germany, and Grindgens in Germany scarcely would have
been in a position to seek suppression of the publication outside
Germany. Being labelled a collaborator might not adversely affect
Gruindgens' status in Germany. The opinion of him by those with
whom he dealt in his daily life could remain unsullied by Mann's
book, which in any event probably was unavailable to them. While
within Germany, Griindgens was immune to criticism from without.
To the ex-patriot German community, the novel was more than a
mere expos6 of Gustaf Grnfidgens. It unmasks the collaborator, the
opportunist as much as a type as a specific individual. Outside
Germany, Griindgens as an individual was unimportant. As a symbol,
however, he became an object of derision.93
Even if one assumes that Mann's motives were evil, factors other
than ill will are material to the determination of the appropriate
remedy if a remedy is appropriate at all.9 That Mann wished to
defile his former brother-in-law is almost utterly without importance
to the finished product. Once a work of literature has left the author's
hands, the author no longer controls its use or interpretation. Unless
the author chooses to alter the text itself, he or she is virtually
powerless to impose a specific interpretation on the text. The work
91 This article will not address the very interesting issue of territoriality. The issue
is really a matter of determining how far to extend the remedy. Does the injunction
include publication outside West Germany so that the United States publisher becomes
subject to sanctions in Germany for publication in the United States? Under rules
of comity, would the German injunction be enforceable in the United States?
Similarly, does Bindrim of Bindrim v. Mitchell, 155 Cal. Rptr. 29, get damages for
injury to his reputation in Germany?
9" Cf. Rosen & Babcock, supra note 4.
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belongs to the readers and its interpretation depends upon their
various interactions with the text. Each reader interprets and utilizes
the product according to the reader's own set of norms. The text is
stabile; its interpretation is not.
Mephisto is a case in point. As early as 1936 Mann asserted that
his Mephisto was not a roman d clef.95 Yet despite his protestations,
the German courts read it in the late 1960s and early 70s as precisely
that, a roman d clef, a thinly veiled attack on Gustaf Griindgens'
honor. 96
The balancing of interests by the German courts appears to dis-
regard the interests of the readers. When their interests are taken
into account, the balancing test becomes far more complex. While
the Federal Constitutional Court correctly identifies the dual nature
of freedom of art, that it includes both the realm of creation and
the realm of effect or reception,97 the court does not appreciate fully
the reach of the latter concept. The realm of effect includes not only
the creator's right to disseminate his or her work but also, and
probably more importantly, the right of the audience to receive the
work and interpret it. The interests at stake are not only the artist's
(or publisher's) opposing the injured individual's right to protection
of personality but equally each potential reader's right of access to
the literary work in order to interpret and exploit it. The realm of
effect is not merely a private interest in the dissemination of the
publication, but a public right of access. 98
To deny the public its right of access is censorship. While the Basic
Law specifically outlaws censorship, 99 characterizing the prohibition
" When the Pariser Tageblatt published the novel in serialized form, supra note
24, Mann objected to the editor's characterization of the novel as a Schlisselroman
(roman d clef). Mephisto, supra note 33, p. VIII-IX of Spangenburg's introduction.
Fish, supra note 92, at 90 (relating the incident involving the popular song
Short People. Groups of short people objected to its bias against them. The singer
asserted that he chose that group to demonstrate by use of irony how absurd prejudice
against any group is. The protesters did not accept his explanation but continued
to accuse him of bias).
91 See supra discussion at note 69.
98 This is not to suggest that the public has a right of access even when the
creator chooses not to release the product into the public's hands, although in some
instances the public's right of access even may outweigh a private individual's right
to withhold the output of his or her creative processes. It suggests only that once
the creator chooses to release his or her literary work to the public, the public has
an interest in receiving it.
" Art. 5 (1), 3d sentence of the Basic Law. In its decision of April 4, 1972, 33
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as censorship adds little to the analysis. Following the appropriate
balancing of interests, censorship may be permissible if the publication
impinges upon other basic rights, for example, where the publication
endangers the constitutional democracy of Germany or the rights of
personality of individuals. o If the court determines that the product
is harmful to the public, or a specific segment of the public, a court
may outlaw it or require that access by the endangered segment of
the public be limited.' 0' In Germany the general laws for protection
of children take precedence over freedom of speech and permit res-
trictions on minors' access to pornography. 0 2
BVerfGE 52 (1972), involving the East German film Der lachende Mann (the laughing
man), the Constitutional Court limited the prohibition on censorship to prior cen-
sorship, i.e., the prohibition on distribution before review and permission from the
censor. The case involved a film distributor's challenge to a law requiring a copy
of each imported film to be deposited with the authorities for review to determine
whether its content is propaganda which might threaten the German democracy.
The court held the law to be a reasonable police regulation under rules governing
commerce. It was not censorship since there was only a criminal penalty for failure
to deposit the copy rather than a requirement of approval before screening.
100 Compare the decision of the Federal Constitutional Court of June 5, 1973, 35
BVerfGE 202 (1973), involving the television documentary about the murder of
soldiers in Lebach matter with its decision of November 3, 1987, 77 BVerfGE 240
(1987), concerning the use of the Free German Youth symbol. In the former case,
the court prohibited German television from showing a documentary drama based
on the murder of several soldiers in Lebach. One of the convicted criminals objected
to use of his name and likeness because the television drama attributed involvement
and motives to him which were inaccurate and showed him in a false and unfavorable
light. The events were no longer newsworthy so the individual's right of personality
outweighed the television network's right to use his name and likeness. The balance
of freedom of art against public protection from subversive organizations came out
in favor of art in the latter case. There use of the symbol of a group outlawed
under Art. 9 (2) of the Basic Law (freedom of association except when group
advocates violating criminal laws or is directed against the constitutional order),
while prohibited generally, could be used in advertising for performance of a literary
work-in this case a play by Brecht.
101 Compare the requirement that the Consumer Product Safety Commission de-
termine that an item is hazardous before it may demand the product's withdrawal
from the market, and consider the function of the Food and Drug Administration
which must approve a drug for distribution in the United States so long as its
manufacturer demonstrates that it is "safe and effective." While literature has no
implications for physical health, its suppression may have an adverse impact on the
mental health of the general public. Arguably, some types of literature may affect
adversely specific segments of the general public such as children. Presumably,
pornography may be outlawed precisely because it is deemed harmful to its consumers
and the community at large.
-02 The Heinrich case, 11 BVerfGE 234 (1960), confirms the permissibility of these
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Generalized denial to the public of its right of access to a literary
work because of the harm it may do to a specific individual, however,
has potentially grave repercussions. Given the broad range of pro-
spective readers/interpreters of the literary work, it seems unlikely
that reception by all possible readers would be harmful to the libelled
individual. Ideally, access by only that limited group of readers who
will interpret the work as applicable to and truthful in its depiction
of the libelled individual should be restricted. All other interpretations
and uses of the work do not conflict with the rights of the individual
and, therefore, deserve full protection.
In many cases a properly tailored limitation on access will prove
elusive. The courts in the Mephisto litigation were spared consider-
ation of the greater problem of generalized restriction on access. The
book had been published at one time. Copies of it were available to
those who made a significant effort to seek them out. The text would
be preserved despite the injunction on publication, and the decisions
contemplated re-publication in the future. The restriction on access
which the courts selected was temporary and limited in scope. It did
not require all owners of early editions of the work to turn them in
to the state for destruction. Thus, the text was fully durable. 03 It
would survive the injunction. Only some readers during the period
of publication prohibition were deprived of access to the text. Most
often litigation and, more importantly, the threat of litigation, will
have a far more extensive long term impact. Although it is extremely
difficult to draw general conclusions where a creative process is
involved, one suspects that restricting access frequently will be tan-
tamount to complete and permanent denial of access.
laws under Art. 5(2) of the Basic Law as limitations on freedom of speech. Ap-
parently, further challenge under Art. 5(3) protecting art which is not subject to
Art. 5(2) limitations, see discussion supra in text accompanying and following note
58, has not occurred, but the result under a balancing test is likely to be the same.
, Justice Brennan utilized the concept of durability of speech in justifying the
permissibility of greater regulation of commercial than non-commercial speech. Vir-
ginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S.
748, 772 n. 24 (1976). My colleague, Professor Alan Howard, builds the concept
of durability into his relational framework for analyzing schemes regulating or limiting
commercial speech in his recent article. Alan Howard, The Constitutionality of
Deceptive Speech Regulations: Replacing the Commercial Speech Doctrine with a
Tort-Based Relational Framework, 41 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 1093 (1992). The
concept would seem to work equally well for analyzing speech in a less commercial
context as an alternative to the more traditional concerns about chilling effects.
Hardy or durable speech is speech which is unlikely to be chilled by regulation or
tort remedies.
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Intuitively, one may feel it preferable to provide increasing pro-
tection as perception of artistry increases. An artist may be uncon-
cerned with his or her impact upon the society or even whether or
not there are buyers for the work. That type of artist might continue
outpourings of genius even if a court enjoined publication of the
product or publishers shunned it. The artistic production in such a
case would be fully durable and in need of little protection. Of course
such artistry assumes an artist of independent means or a benefactor
who protects the artist from the need to become concerned with the
world and its demands. At best that image, which is reminiscent of
the late nineteenth century French and German movement of "art
for art's sake,"' 1 4 describes only a fragment of the artistic world.
Writers rarely are wholly independent of their readers-or at least
of having readers at all. It is more realistic to identify a continuum
of audience dependence which determines the durability of the literary
production with the least hardy work arguably requiring the greatest
art or speech protection. Perhaps counterintuitively, it may be the
least artistic individual within the artistic spectrum who is in the
greatest need of speech or art protection. The financially independent
poet lies at one end of a continuum of reader dependence being the
least dependent and the author of pulp fiction, westerns, romances,
thrillers, and pornography, lies at the other being the most dependent.
Of the literary genres, poetry, as the least accessible to general
readers, also must be least reader dependent. 05 Books of poetry tend
to appear in quite small editions, generate little profit and are rarely
the topic of widespread public discussion. Typically critics view poetry
as personal to the author expressing the innermost thoughts and
feelings. Because poetry often is personal reflection, it is quite hardy
and requires little protection to survive. Absence of readers may have
little impact upon that poet's need for poetic expression.
,o, L'art pour Part became the rallying cry of such poets as Charles Baudelaire
and Stefan Mallarme in France and Stefan George in Germany. In the English
speaking world, Oscar Wilde is most closely associated with the concept, which
frequently is referred to as aestheticism. For English speakers, Getrude Stein also
comes to mind. Such writers reject interpretation as unimportant to the work. Art
need have no meaning. Its very existence justifies it. Many readers find the works
of those poets impenetrable. The phrase is from VICTOR COUSIN, COURS DE PHI-
LOSOPHrE (1918), and the full quotation reads: "[Wle need religion for religion's
sake, morality for morality's sake, art for art's sake."
105 Mark Strand, Slow Down for Poetry, N.Y. TImEs BOOK REV., Sept. 10, 1991
at 1.
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Alternatively, one might address the issue by attempting to quantify
and balance relative harms. Since poetry lacks the mass audience,
few people would suffer injury to their right to access from sup-
pression of the poetic product. By the same token, however, the risk
of injury to the individual whom the poem portrays adversely is
minimal owing both to the small audience and the difficulties en-
countered in the interpretive process. Interpretive difficulty diminishes
the likelihood that the "libellous" statements concerning the indi-
vidual will be attributed to that individual or understood as reflecting
adversely on him or her. Indeed the effort required by the reader to
interpret the poem signals and emphasizes to the reader that any
events or individuals the poem depicts have been filtered through the
poet's imagination rendering them unreliable with respect to factual
content. The form warns the reader to question thoroughly before
accepting the accuracy of the poem's reportage.
The pulp fiction business tends to be quite profitable, and most
authors of such literature are in the business for the money perhaps
more so than from the need to express themselves artistically.' °6 If
the market for the product is restricted or there is a risk that it will
be restricted-if the publishers will not publish or the courts directly
or indirectly prevent publication-the author will modify the product
or not write at all. Thus, pulp is the least durable literary product
and accordingly most in need of protection. Depriving the author of
a market, deprives her or him of a livelihood. The artistic product
becomes susceptible to influences extraneous to the creative process,
such as the threat of litigation, which might alter the final form and
cause it to differ from the product the author would have produced
free from such influences. Law inhibits the creative process.' °7 In
view of the size of the market for the pulp fiction, the legal imped-
iments to publication and dissemination may deprive a significant
number of readers of access to the "genuine" literary work, that is,
the work the author would have produced free from the threat of
legal action, and, sometimes the work in any form, as the author
seeks another livelihood. 08
106 It is interesting to note that several twentieth century American authors of
serious literature, including William Faulkner, have written other types of literature
for a mass audience in order to support themselves.
,01 Charles Rembar in the roundtable discussion, Libel in Fiction supra note 4,
at 485, would disagree with this conclusion. He expressed the opinion that concern
about potential libel suits may improve the quality of manuscripts. He relates an
incident in which, in his opinion, it did because it forced the writer to reconsider
the work and exercise greater imagination.
1"8 Spangenberg, in his introduction to Mephisto, supra note 33, suggests that
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Unlike poetry, pulp fiction often lacks the stylistic indicia of un-
reliability. The narration generally is straightforward making it easy
to read. It is the most accessible literary genre at certain interpretive
levels. Readers may respond to it viscerally, if not intellectually.
Some, but not all, readers and potential readers of the product use
it for its libellous content. Others derive from it opportunities to
escape reality, voyeuristic pleasure and even pure aesthetic enjoyment
in no way associated with the injured individual. Although it may
be fair to deprive the former group of readers of their opportunity
to exploit the work unadulterated by the effect of litigation or its
threat, so depriving the latter group of readers lacks such justification.
Certainly the size of the market subjects an individual whom the
work libels to a greater volume of injury than a poem. The number
of people receiving the libellous message is greater and, therefore, it
is reasonable to assume that the number of people using the message
for its libellous content also is greater. Directly or indirectly preventing
publication, however, simultaneously harms a larger segment of the
reading public whose use of the work would have been without evil
purpose.'°9
Balancing the interests of the author and reading public on the
one hand and the interests of the libelled individual on the other
threatens to become a formidable task, especially where permanent
rather than temporary loss of access to the literary work is at stake.
While the court denies it, the decision of the appellate court in
Mephisto displays signs that the court based its ultimate decision in
part upon its judgment about the quality and importance of the
novel." 0 That basis for decision seems quite sensible in fact. It re-
sembles typical, economic cost-benefit analysis. The issue is whether
greater harm is done to the reading public and the author by pro-
hibition or to the libelled individual by publication. If the novel is
without literary or historical value and the publication will do some
injury to the individual, prohibition seems appropriate. If the novel
has great literary value, the injury to the individual may well prove
there may have been a link between the refusal of a West German publisher to
publish the book in 1949 and Mann's suicide a short time later.
109 Moreover, the larger the audience, the more likely that the fictional work will
generate commentary in the media and a concomitant likelihood that the false light
in which the fiction displays the injured individual will be debated, the truth known,
and the adverse impact of the fictional account ameliorated or neutralized.
11o See supra text accompanying note 43. On a more elementary level, it is possible
that willingness to enjoin publication of the novel reflects a particular sensitivity in
Germany to allegations that one was a Nazi or Nazi collaborator.
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less weighty than the value of the survival of the literary product.",
Employing such an analysis, at first glance, pulp fiction which may
be libellous has little chance of surviving the balancing test. The
critical standards of educated and cultured readers-judges generally
being educated or cultured or both-assign little literary value to pulp
fiction. Pulp is found wanting. It tends to be formulaic, its characters
one dimensional, lacking nuance." 2 Its themes are common through-
out the genre; the contemporary critical eye discerns little variation
from one story to the next. Yet despite the certainty that a novel of
that type has no significant worth, it nevertheless sells. Many readers
deem it worth its cover price. If the novel were indistinguishable
from others of the genre, why does not the reader of such fiction
simply read the same novel over and over again? Perhaps the critic's
eye is undiscerning while the reader perceives the nuances, to which
the critic is blind, but which make each new novel appealing. Popular
culture frequently differs from culture which catches the critics' eyes,
but that hardly justifies treating it less favorably under the legal
system. Couched slightly differently, is it reasonable to render a
judgment or perpetuate a system which might condemn a product of
that genre to oblivion and permanently deprive the public of its use?
If this question is troublesome when one deals with what critics
might classify as a "low" art form, it must become even more difficult
as the artistic product moves closer to the recognized higher art forms
of the day. Even if it were reasonable to assign lower value to lower
art forms thereby acknowledging that the legal values are those of
the dominant forces within the society, position along the cultural
continuum from lower to higher art is by no means static. Cultural
positioning and perceptions of value constantly change. Examples of
such change are ubiquitous.
Contemporaneous critics of Shakespeare's plays would not have
viewed them as high art. The plays were designed for accessibility
by a mass audience. They are bawdy, replete with puns and sexual
allusions. Yet today and for the past several hundred years, even the
"I The American approach appears to bring the issue close to pure economic
analysis. Since damages are the only remedy available, the work survives but possibly
loses its profit potential to the injured party. Unfortunately, the more likely result
is that the author will not write the novel or the publisher not publish the manuscript
in order to avoid the damage exposure. Permanent removal of the work or potential
work from the literary world ensues nevertheless.
"2 According to Justice Stein of the Federal Constitutional Court, lack of nuance
signals to the reader that the character is unreal, fictional, and not to be associated
with real individuals. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
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most educated and cultured readers have regarded those plays as a
highpoint of western culture. Imagine the loss if a court of the day
enjoined a play before the scribe who would have transcribed it at
the performance had an opportunity to view the play, or the Globe
Theatre refused to produce one of Shakespeare's plays for fear of
having to respond in damages for the libel contained in it. Shakespeare
may even have censored himself in order to have his plays produced.
Perhaps all these events occurred, and we are ignorant of it-a loss
nevertheless.
The perceived value of a literary work may even oscillate. Such
may well be the case with Mephisto itself. When first published, the
book may have had considerable cultural value to the German exile
community, while in the late 1960s, the courts may correctly have
characterized it as having severely limited cultural value, "libel in
the form of a novel.""' And it may take on additional or different
cultural value as the society and its interests change, just as fairy
tales took on new cultural importance and validity during the early
nineteenth century as natural, immediate cultural forms, untainted
by modern society, only to be relegated to the status of children's
stories during most of the twentieth century. Recently they have come
to be viewed as parables for adult audiences, rather terrifying to
children.
Not only may position on the cultural continuum change over time
and with different societal structures, but use by readers of the written
work also may change and with that change the value of the work.
Jonathan Swift's "A Modest Proposal" in its day was a political
essay. Today it is frequently part of the repertoire of English literature
courses or courses in irony and satire, chosen for its enduring literary
rather than political value. At the same time it might be part of a
history curriculum for its contribution to an understanding of the
conditions of the time.
Similarly, Icelandic family sagas have been used for different pur-
poses at different times. In the thirteenth century when they were
composed, or if not composed, committed to parchment from their
oral form, their use probably was for entertainment and perhaps also
for the christian ethics many of them taught. Later they lost much
value, and, but for Arne Magnusson's collecting of manuscripts in
the 16th century," 4 may have disappeared. Arne Magnusson wished
"3 See Judgment of March 10, 1966, 51 UFITA 362.
'" Except for some manuscripts found in old monasteries, Icelanders who were
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to preserve the sagas as part of the rich Icelandic cultural heritage.
Gradually and through the nineteenth century, readers looked to them
for their historical content in order to learn about 9th and 10th
century Iceland. Later scholars determined that they lack historicity
and began to view them as a developed literary form worthy of
attention for their aesthetic qualities. Recently, scholars have begun
again to exploit them for their historical content but in a manner
different from their use in the 19th century and earlier. Such scholars
do not look to the stories themselves for the historical validity of
the events they depict, but seek to generate an image of the culture
and society during the period of composition. Their method assumes
that writers or transcribers describe conditions as they experience
them even in fictional accounts. Thus, social history can be extracted
even from otherwise fictional works." 5
Against the backdrop of cultural values shifting over time, present
conviction that a literary product has little or no immediate value to
readers offers little certainty as to the long term value of the product.
The stakes seem reasonably straightforward. Threat of legal action
may, and is likely to, chill the creative process in some instances.
Balancing the interests of the willing and unwilling participants to
the literary creation becomes considerably more complex than the
German decisions disclose, as the reader's and potential reader's
interests enter the field of discussion. Addition of a third element
into the analysis in and of itself increases the sheer number of possible
permutations. Even evil motives of the author set opposite an innocent
defamed individual can no longer determine the outcome." 6 Like the
defamed individual, readers and potential readers are also innocent
parties to the conflict. Their interests are not extraneous to the analysis
since they are an integral part of the literary process as receivers
(users) and interpreters of the product. In fact the rights of readers
primarily poor farmers did not collect and preserve the manuscripts during the 14th
and 15th centuries. Arne Magnusson, who was a man of vision, wished to save the
manuscripts and preserve his nation's cultural heritage. Surely much to his dismay,
he found that the farmers frequently abused the parchment manuscripts employing
part of them for many undesirable purposes including the patching of holes in the
shoes.
- E.g., WILLIAM MILLER, BLOODTAKING AND PEACEMAKING: FEUD, LAW, AND
SOCIETY IN SAGA ICELAND (University of Chicago Press 1990). Perhaps pulp fiction
one day will serve a similar function for future historians. Consider also UNDER-
STANDING AMERICAN HISTORY THROUGH FICTION (Warren A. Beck & Myles L. Clowers
eds., McGraw-Hill 1975).
16 Cf. Rosen & Babcock, supra note 44.
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arguably are superior to those of both the author and the injured
individual insofar as readers are the only participants having a long
term interest in the literary process. Long after both the author and
the injured party have been forgotten, there are likely to be readers
whom the legal system today may deprive of the opportunity to use
and interpret products on account of the short term interests of a
single individual.
III. CONCLUSION
Under German law, outcome of the legal issue depends upon a
balancing of the conflicting interests guaranteed by the Basic Law.
While Germany's courts have had an opportunity to give the issue
an airing at all judicial levels, in this writer's view, their decisions
fail to give ample consideration to the rights of the recipients of art.
Uncertainty as to the long term-value of literary products to readers,
accompanied by the risk that availability of legal remedies to injured
individuals chills the creative process, leads to the conclusion that
potential long term harm to the creative process and its reader par-
ticipants outweighs the short term harm to individuals libelled by
fictional works. The courts in Mephisto themselves emphasize the
short term nature of the harm by limiting the remedy to a temporary
injunction, albeit of unspecified duration. Leaving injured individuals
without a remedy seems justified where the creative process is jeop-
ardized.
This is not to suggest that everything anyone writes should be
published. Publishers make aesthetic and economic judgments which
similarly chill the creative process. Some items which in the future,
and even in the present, have great value are not published. Perhaps
publishers are not the best candidates for making publication deci-
sions, but at least they are immediately linked to the literary, creative
process. Their judgment is unavoidable. Judges are not part of that
process and should not inject themselves into it."7
No doubt cases will arise which make us uneasy leaving an injured
individual without legal recourse. This article does not deny that
fictional works may damage reputation. Unfortunately, to carve out
exceptions to the strict rule of protection for fiction returns the issue
to a state of uncertainty which may affect behavior, chill artistic
117 Mhring, supra note 61, at 579-80, (expressing similar discomfort at judicial
involvement in judgment of the quality or characterization of an item as art).
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production and deprive the present and future consumer of literature
of a valuable literary work. As the reading public grows accustomed
to fiction's absolute privilege, its skepticism concerning the content
of what it reads labelled as fiction hopefully will increase, and the
damage to the defamed individual decrease commensurately.
